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TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN CORN GROWERS ASSOCIATION ON

THE FAMILY FARM AGRICULTURE

RECOVERY AND MAINTENANCE ACT

THE FAMILY F.A.R.M. ACT

A Program to Restore and Maintain Prosperity

On America's Family Farms and Ranches

PRESENTED TO THE SENATE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE

JULY 12, 2001

BY

KEITH DITTRICH

PRESIDENT

AMERICAN CORN GROWERS ASSOCIATION

For more information contact:

Keith Dittrich, President 402-368-7786

Larry Mitchell, Chief Executive Officer 202-835-0331

Chairman Harkin, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the Senate Agriculture Committee, I am Keith Dittrich, President of the American Corn Growers Association. Seated with me today is Larry Mitchell, our Washington based Chief Executive Officer.

The ACGA has long recognized the daunting task Congress faces in writing our new farm bill, a task made particularly difficult because of the deepening economic depression endured by family agriculture and rural communities in the United States. A primary goal of our organization is to provide leadership on this new farm bill, through positive and specific suggestions for change. Therefore, on behalf of the 14,000 members of the American Corn Growers Association, I would like to present our comprehensive farm bill proposal to the committee today.

We wish it noted that our farm bill proposal is much more than a corn proposal. We have always attempted to represent the interests of not only corn farmers, but also all those in agriculture. We believe that all family farmers must work together to find a farm policy that restores prosperity to family farmers and ranchers of all types. We adhere to the quote made famous by one of our nation's founding fathers, "we must all hang together, or we will most assuredly all hang separately".

We also understand that corn is the most widely grown crop in the U.S., and has by far the largest production volume of any commodity. It has the largest livestock feed usage, and the largest industrial usage. Therefore, we recognize that feed grain policy has a huge impact on all commodity prices, and also directly impacts the structure of the dairy and livestock industries.

Our broad-based comprehensive proposal, titled The Family Farm Agriculture Recovery and Maintenance Act (The Family F.A.R.M. Act) is much more than a commodity specific farm bill proposal. It is a long-term plan designed to benefit a broad spectrum of agriculture. It has been developed over the past two years through a process of detailed historical analysis of past farm programs, and through grassroots consensus building among a number of farm organizations around the country. Since September of 2000 it has been in the legislative drafting process, and this spring we contracted with the Agricultural Policy Analysis Center at the University of Tennessee to score the proposal.

Our proposal was one of the most detailed of any to be presented to the House Agriculture Committee, and we believe was the only one that makes significant farm income improvements over the status quo, consisting of current policy supplemented with emergency AMTA payments.

That being said, I would like to explain the background, development, and outline of our farm bill proposal.

My testimony will cover three main areas:

1. A brief background of the development process used for our farm bill proposal, and the original goals we had when we started that process.

2. A summary of what has happened to farmers over the past 25 years in the areas of farm prices, farm programs, farm income, agricultural trade, domestic use, total use, and crop surpluses. I will refer to attached tables called "Key Indicators of the U.S. Farm Sector, A 25 Year History with Inflation Adjustments". This research is a basis for much of our farm bill proposal.

3. An overview and explanation of the main points of The Family F.A.R.M. Act. A copy of the proposal is also attached.

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND ORIGINAL GOALS

In the summer of 1999, we saw that it was becoming more and more obvious that the Freedom to Farm legislation was failing on almost every front, just as the American Corn Growers, National Farmers Union, and many others had predicted in 1995 and 1996. We predicted this failure, because we understood that production agriculture was a fundamentally unique business worldwide, and that it would not react as Freedom to Farm supporters had advised Congress.

Farm prices had collapsed as we predicted, and government costs were skyrocketing. In spite of extremely low prices, export volume was stagnant, and foreign production continued to increase. We knew that farm policy needed to change in order to bring agriculture and rural America out of it's ever deepening depression.

Therefore, we perceived the need to provide positive alternatives to current policy as soon as possible. We knew that the process of change in farm legislation would be long, slow, arduous, and confusing. We hoped that improvements in farm policy could be made before 2002. But knew that even if a new farm bill was not debated and passed until 2002, we couldn't wait until then to develop specific solutions, and consensus. And so in the late summer of 1999 we began the process of developing a comprehensive farm bill proposal.

We had five main goals when we started our farm bill development process. These were:

1. Compile factual data to illustrate what has happened to farmers financially over the past two decades, and to discount some myths about farm programs and agricultural trade.

2. Determine what levels of farm commodity prices and/or incomes are required to improve the rural economy, and develop a logical justification and process for achieving these price and income levels.

3. Construct a detailed as possible farm bill proposal that achieved necessary price and income levels. Follow the long held policy positions of the American Corn Growers Association and our friends in National Farmers Union and other like-minded organizations. But very importantly, also address the criticisms of past farm programs voiced by those who have historically not held our policy positions. Appeal to as many interests as possible, including consumers.

4. Make contact with, gain input from, and build consensus with, as many of our friends in other farm organizations as possible. Make contact with, and build the interest of, key individuals in legislative, leadership, and academic positions.

5. Through the combination of these efforts, enact federal legislation that made large improvements in farm and food policy hopefully by 2001, and definitely by 2002. But also be prepared and determined to fight until 2005, and beyond if needed, to make further improvements if necessary, because we knew the powerful agribusiness interests who have helped destroy effective farm programs over the last 15 years would continue to attempt to confuse and manipulate Congress and producers.

The first and second goals resulted in the development of the previously referred to tables called "Key Indicators of the U.S. Farm Sector, A 25 year History with Inflation Adjustments". We compiled these tables in August and September of 1999 for ACGA and Nebraska Farmers Union. They were first used by Ranking Member Charles Stenholm in September of 1999, and have been widely used around the country in a number of forums for over a year. These tables were updated in December of 2000, based on current USDA figures at that time. Neither USDA nor any other farm organization has ever compiled such data.

These tables will be updated again in August of this year to reflect current USDA and inflation data. They will be updated annually every year thereafter, at the end of each marketing year for corn.

The specifics of our farm bill proposal were then developed based on the research contained in the "Key Indicators" tables. But we also reached out to a number of other organizations and individuals during that process, and in particular worked in conjunction with Nebraska Farmers Union. We also continually tried to design the program to appeal to some of the critics of past farm programs, particularly in the areas of flexibility, supply management, and price support.

Our proposal is much different than current farm policy. But while using variations of some of the proven tools of past farm programs, it is also much different than any past farm policy. The American Corn Growers Association is a relatively new and rapidly growing organization for a reason. We have new ideas that make bridges with other organizations, and varied interests.

KEY INDICATORS OF THE U.S. FARM SECTOR

We believe that in order to develop good farm policy we must have an understanding of what has happened in the past. For comparison, on my farm, I have a good idea of what my average yields will be, based on past experience. I know that I cannot expect dramatically higher yields than my past averages, and therefore I should make my economic and production plans accordingly. And also based on past experience, I have a good idea of what production practices worked, which ones didn't work, and what potential problems I might face each year. Farm policy has its similarities.

The attached tables cover 12 very important and interconnected statistics that relate to farm prices, farm programs, agricultural exports, domestic and total use, crop surpluses, and farm income. These figures cover 25 years, and are based on recent and historical statistics from the Economic Research Service and Farm Service Agency at USDA. Inflation figures are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which calculates Consumer Price Index data.

The data in these tables go right to the heart of the farm policy debate. I urge all Committee members to examine them carefully. Many of the conventional wisdom statements we in agriculture have heard over the years are simply not true. Many other things we have suspected to be true, we haven't seen quantified. For example, the eroding effects of inflation on farm prices and income or price supports.

All five major storable commodities (Corn, Wheat, Soybeans, Cotton, and Rice) are covered in the tables, and all five show very similar trends. I would like to refer to some of the most important observations apparent from the data in the Key Indicators tables, such as:

1. Real, inflation adjusted CCC price support loan rates have dropped dramatically over the past 25 years, and real farm prices have dropped in a similar manner. Real farm prices are now approximately one third of what they were during the decade of the 1970's.

2. On average, export volume of all major commodities has been virtually static over the past 25 years, regardless of farm price support policy, trade agreements, or currency valuations. While in December USDA was predicting a sharp increase in corn exports to 2.3 billion bushels this crop year, the most recent USDA estimate had fallen to 1.9 billion bushels, right in line with our historical average.

3. Our agricultural trade balance has also been static to declining in nominal terms, and sharply declining in inflation adjusted terms. This indicates that we are not exporting more raw grain commodities in the form of increased net exports of value added foods or meat. New imports are outpacing any increased exports of these sorts of products.

4. On the other hand our domestic use of commodities has increased steadily over the past 25 years. Virtually all of our growth in total use of crops has come from the domestic market, not the export market.

5. Total use of commodities is now at all time record highs, and did not decline during the Asian Crisis (with the exception of cotton). In spite of this, farm prices have collapsed. It is apparent that increased usage alone is not enough to give farmers profitable farm prices.

6. On a historical basis, ending stocks to use ratios, or surpluses, are now tight to modest. Ending stocks or surpluses have not been high during the five years of the Freedom to Farm Act. This year, world ending stocks of wheat are at historical lows, with a poor crop in the U.S. Ending stocks of soybeans for the 2000 crop year will likely drop below 10 percent of usage, a historically very tight level. In spite of this, farm prices have collapsed. It is interesting to note for the 1999 crop year ending in September of 2000, final actual ending stocks to use ratios for soybeans, cotton and rice dropped dramatically versus projections made a year earlier in August of 1999. Yet farm prices moved up hardly at all during that crop year.

It is obvious that in the absence of other farm policy tools, we will have to run on the razors edge of running out of commodities all the time in order to maintain profitable farm prices. This is an impossible and dangerous task.

7. In spite of increasing yields and government payments, real gross income per acre for basic commodities has dropped 40 to 50 percent over the past 25 years including emergency federal payments. We need to increase gross income per acre on corn about $100 per acre over current levels, just to get back to the real gross income levels we had during the farm crisis years of the mid-1980's.

8. With emergency AMTA payments included, farmers have received a national average equivalent price of over $2.60/bushel for corn, and over $4.00/bushel for wheat for the past 5 years. Yet these equivalent price levels are in reality so low in today's economy, that they have given us our farm depression today. Any mix of income support and/or market price that only achieves these equivalent price levels guarantees a deepening farm depression.

These observations are simply the facts. It is obvious that the farm policy debate must revolve around these realities. We can no longer afford to base national farm policy on misconceptions, misguided economic theory, and poor advice. We must base future farm policy on market realities, fact, and logic.

So, if this is what has happened, where do we go from here with farm policy? Following is an explanation of the key points about our Family F.A.R.M. Act proposal.

OVERVIEW AND EXPLANATION OF THE BILL

The proposed Findings of Congress, formulas, and outline for our proposal are attached to this testimony. Following is an explanation of the main concepts in the bill.

Summary of the Bill

The overall goal of our bill is to give farmers tools to extract profitable farm prices from the market place, with much less reliance on government payments. The 10- year budget for agricultural programs just passed budgets approximately 15 billion dollars less annually than was actually spent on farm programs in Fiscal-Year 2000. If we do not give farmers tools to increase farm prices, we will run far short of the money required just to maintain current income supports, which are still inadequate.

To obtain price, this bill is primarily a free stocks management bill rather than a supply management bill. However it does provide for voluntary production adjustments, but only if deemed necessary by the Secretary, and only if endings stocks reach predetermined minimum trigger levels.

We think that only small acreage idling would be required in some years if current commodity usage were maintained. Farmers can voluntarily manage free stocks and inventories through the extended CCC loan, the farmer owned reserve, and a strategic energy reserve. And if needed, they can voluntarily affect large surpluses with a flexible acreage idling program.

We are strong supporters of S. 670, the Daschle/Lugar Renewable Fuels Standard legislation now proposed in Congress, as part of a national energy policy. Our members had much to do with this legislation. Our bill's Farmer Owned Reserve can at least partially be used for a strategic energy reserve to help stabilize the resulting growth in the domestic renewable fuels industry. Our intention is to keep total commodity use as high as possible, through both new domestic use and trade initiatives.

Findings of Congress

The first part of our legislative bill will contain a section called the "Findings of Congress" as detailed in our attached proposal. This is a preamble to a bill, which describes why Congress feels this important legislation is necessary. The intent of this section is to define by law why a decentralized, competitive, family farm structure of food production is desirable to society. Also defined will be why the business of farming and food production is unique, and why long-term legislation is necessary to allow family agriculture to prosper, and to protect consumers of the world. We feel that it is very important that Congress debate these things, and get these ideas out in the open for public debate. Our proposed "Findings of Congress" language is one of the most important parts of the Family F.A.R.M. Act, and we urge Committee members to closely review this language in our attached proposal.

To summarize the findings language, we believe several things. We believe that a family farm and ranch structure of food production is desirable to society as a whole, and is also a national security issue for our country. We believe that this structure provides many multi-faceted benefits to society that cannot be measured in pure economic terms. We also believe in economic justice for rural regions.

We also must recognize that farming is much different than other businesses in three key areas:

· First, farmers have virtually no ability to negotiate price with buyers. This is because millions of farmers sell to a handful of buyers. Most manufacturing and retail businesses sell to a large base of buyers or consumers, and have much more price setting and negotiating power.

· Secondly, farmers as individuals have no control over their output or inventories, due to weather, long production cycles, and all the vagaries of agricultural production.

· Third, consumers must have a stable food supply, because food is a daily necessity, and food shortages are intolerable. California is experiencing chaos due to rolling power shortages. What sort of chaos do you suppose a rolling food shortage would cause, even once in a lifetime?

Finally, the findings say the combination of all these factors requires legislation that gives family agriculture the tools of price negotiation and inventory management, and that protects consumers.

Next, we state what advantages we feel our proposal will provide. These are:

1. Simplicity.

2. Planting flexibility.

3. Supply stability and food safety.

4. A market orientation.

5. A level playing field for new agricultural trade negotiations.

6. Reasonable and more predictable government costs.

7. Tools to encourage consumption and maintain market share.

8. Family sized crop production will be encouraged.

9. Family sized livestock production will be encouraged.

10. Market concentration will addressed in a more effective manner.

11. The bill is non-inflationary.

Outline of the Bill

The next part of the attached proposal outlines the basic parts of the bill. We have initially proposed very specific ending stocks and reserve trigger levels, maximum volumes eligible for the loan levels targeted to family sized farms, etc. for analysis. We will finalize those specifics after completing computer simulations.

Price and Income Support

Price and Income support would be provided to crop producers by a new, unique CCC "Market Participation Loan" only. This structure would limit any repayment of the loan below loan price to a minimum of 80% of the loan rate, at the discretion of the Secretary. Maximum government exposure in Market Loss Gains would therefore be 20% of the loan rate.

The loan structure is a fair, simple, and easily targeted way to support family farmers. It is the best tool to help farmers negotiate price with buyers, and it can also be a vehicle for counter cyclical income to farmers if repayment below loan price is allowed. However, we believe the current Loan Deficiency Payment option associated with the loan is often unfair, is expensive, and is generally price depressing. We would eliminate this option. Under our proposal, a producer would have to put grain or cotton under loan initially to take advantage of the program. If producers were allowed to repay at less than loan rate to avoid forfeitures, they would have to actually market the grain at that time, or feed the commodity. This would promote actual movement of the commodities at the time, if the producer took his/her option to repay below the loan rate. They could no longer speculate on price volatility in an attempt to maximize government payments, while holding unprotected inventories.

An optional 9-month extension of the loan would encourage buyers to be more competitive, and allow farmers another tool to manage free stocks and inventory.

We would target the loan to family farmers by setting a maximum volume eligible for the loan. For scoring simulations, we have initially proposed maximums of 125,000 bushels for corn, 65,000 bushels for wheat, 35,000 bushels for soybeans, 1,000,000 lbs for cotton, and 65,000 cwt. for rice. These limits would apply per family operator (not employees), including spouses and minor children. Partnerships or family farm corporations would get multiple limits consistent with the number of family operators involved, as just defined.

Agricultural Equity Formula

An "Agricultural Equity Formula" would be used to establish loan rates, which again would be the primary income support mechanism. Presently, loan rates are not based on anything. We believe that must be changed. We would base them on a percentage of what farmers received for gross per acre income during the last generally prosperous period for farmers and rural America, the decade of the 1970's. We define this as a Base Period for gross income purposes. However, the formula would base the actual loan rate on current yields and inflation, and we would balance the loan rates equitably between commodities. This formula is a way of returning a very necessary gross income stream not only to farmers, but to the economies of rural communities. This gross income per acre target is a concept that is important, and could also be used if we eventually arrive at a farm program that combines direct payments and higher loan rates. The specific formula mechanism is detailed in the attached proposal.

We would also adjust the loan rates annually to reflect inflation and trend-line increases in yields. We would use the inflation factor associated with the Food Eaten at Home series of the Consumer Price Index. For the past 25 years, retail food prices have risen at generally the same rate as the total Consumer Price Index, in spite of level to declining farm prices. This is unfair to both farmers and consumers.

Our formula would assure that farmers and rural communities receive an equitable share of the retail food dollar, while assuring that consumers would get the price benefit of increasing yields due to technology. If trend-line yield increases matched inflation, loan rates would stay the same. However, if inflation rates exceeded trend-line yield increases, loan rates would slowly rise. We would also initially phase in higher loan rates over several years, much as minimum wage increases are now phased in.

Our legislative draft would set 2001 loan rates that would equate to 70% of the gross per acre income farmers received during the base period, and phase in to 80% of that gross income over 5 years. Initial loan rates would therefore be about $3.15/bushel for corn. This figure is also very close to the target price of $3.03 farmers had as far back as the mid-1980's, it is very close to USDA's current cost of production estimates, and it is slightly less than the average farm price during 1996, the first year of Freedom to Farm.

Keep in mind, when considering AMTA payments, supplemental AMTA payments, Loan Deficiency Payments, and Market Loss Gains, we have been averaging the equivalent of about $2.60/bushel on corn and $4.00 for wheat during the Freedom to Farm years. We have received these equivalent prices at full production, and with generally excellent crops across the U.S. Yet agriculture is still in a depression.

Other crop loan rates would be set at historical price ratios in relation to corn. The soybean loan rate would then be $7.55/bushel, wheat would be $4.50/bushel, cotton would be 80 cents per lb., and rice would be $10.10 per cwt. These values are less than we originally started at, and we would consider them the minimum prices we need to receive in the absence of direct government payments, in order to restore any prosperity to the family farm economy and rural communities.

Farmer Owned Reserve

A new Farmer Owned Reserve would be established. The reserve is the key tool that allows farmers to manage their inventories and free stocks. If prices are low and free stocks excessive, the market will know that farmers may choose to lock up some of their inventory, and make it unavailable until prices rise. The reserve is a necessary buffer that allows farmers to have high production years without unduly depressing market prices. Acreage idling is then not required after high production years, unless reserve stocks are becoming excessive. At the same time, consumers are assured that if we have a major drought, the U.S. will have reserves that will be made available, though at higher prices. This stability of supply encourages stable growth in exports, renewable fuels production, food processing, and livestock production. A portion of the FOR would be dedicated to a Strategic Energy Reserve for the renewable fuels industry.

For scoring simulations, we have proposed the FOR be opened if projected endings stocks to use ratios outside the reserve are greater than 10% for corn, 20% for wheat, 8% for soybeans, 15% for cotton, and 15% for rice. Maximum reserve levels as a percentage of total use are set at 30% for corn, 30% for wheat, 10% for soybeans, 20% for cotton, and 10% for rice.

Discretionary Authority for Short-term Acreage Idling

The Secretary shall have the authority to institute a short-term acreage idling program only if ending stocks to use ratios including the reserve reach trigger levels. This authority could be used if any commodity reached trigger levels. We have set initial trigger levels at 15% for corn, 20% for wheat, 10% for soybeans, and 20% for cotton. The Secretary must institute acreage idling if FOR levels are projected to reach maximums in the current marketing year.

We would allow set-asides up to 5% to be used in return for eligibility for the base loan rates. We would provide for higher loan rates in exchange for higher set-asides for acreage idling ranging from 6 to 15%.

Tillable Crop Acreage

A Tillable Crop Acreage base will be established for each producer. This will consist of all acres normally cropped by a producer. Farmers will have the same planting flexibility they have now on all acres planted to crops covered by the program. If we have an acreage idling program, farmers will choose what to plant on non-idled acres, based on their ideas of the market.

Target Price System for Livestock

A target price and deficiency payment program would be studied for livestock as detailed in the attached proposal. We believe that livestock producers should have some protection under the farm program. The packing industry has become so non-competitive, and unfair imports have become so common, that we believe livestock producers should have some protection from extreme market drops such as the hog industry has experienced. Therefore, we have proposed this concept, to be reviewed by USDA and livestock producers.

Eligible production would be limited to a maximum number of cwt. or head, targeted to family sized farms or ranches in a manner consistent with the maximums used for loan rates. Payments would be based on the difference between the annually set target price, and the annual national average market price. Target prices could be tied to feed-grain loan rates.

Market Concentration

Market concentration in the food industry is continuing at an unprecedented pace, and is one of the most serious issues we face in the food industry. We believe that this is a very dangerous situation for both consumers and producers. We believe that this ever-increasing market power is affecting producers and consumers in two ways. In the more obvious way, producers and consumers face an ever-shrinking base of food retailers, commodity buyers and farm input suppliers, limiting their opportunities and food choices in the marketplace. In the less obvious way, the concentrated economic power is affecting the political process, and affecting how we debate national farm and food policy.

We believe that unless new legislation is passed, agribusiness and food retailing mergers will continue to overwhelm the will and resources of the Justice Department and USDA. Therefore, we wish to establish a maximum level of market concentration for the agribusiness and food retailing industries. The established maximum level will be consistent with the economic theory of a market share level that causes market distortions. We suggest that no more than 15% of any food related market be held by one company. As much as possible, such legislation should be contained in a competition title of the farm bill. However, we are also open to companion legislation outside the farm bill.

There are also a number of other ways where more effective market concentration legislation can be developed. The ACGA recognizes the Organization for Competitive Markets (OCM) as an expert in this field. We have endorsed the OCM's 2001 Statement of Competition Policy. We urge the Agriculture Committee to review this Statement.

While using these suggestions to work towards more effective market concentration legislation, we also call for a two-year suspension of all large agribusiness mergers.

International Trade

Current trade agreements and negotiating positions do not recognize the unique aspects of food production and food trade around the world, as articulated in our proposed "Findings of Congress". South American production continues to rise, in spite of extremely low world commodity prices. As documented by the Key Indicators of the Farm Sector tables, these agreements have been ineffective in protecting farm income, or in increasing exports. And family farmers in other countries are suffering just as we are.

However, we believe the established agricultural trade negotiation process could be used to develop an entirely new concept in agricultural trade. Let us use the trade negotiation process to provide for a new system of agricultural trade that reduces trade tensions both within and outside agriculture. And let us develop trading rules that allow family agriculture to survive in all countries.

We believe that the Secretary of Agriculture should be directed to approach her or his counterparts in other major exporting and importing countries about their interest in the following concepts:

1. A shared system of international food reserves, to be used for food security, humanitarian relief, and an international school lunch program for developing nations. This reserve could primarily be held in the United States due to our infrastructure advantages.

2. Shared production cuts by food exporting nations when world grain stocks become burdensome, to be enacted only in coordination with an international food reserve.

3. The recognition and limiting of world market distortions caused by anti-competitive commodity trading and food processing companies.

National Farmers Union of Canada proposed similar initiatives this past fall, and in a presentation in France this past spring, the ACGA was told that the largest farm organization in France had similar views.

Scoring

The Agricultural Policy Analysis Center (APAC) at the University of Tennessee has provided preliminary numbers to us. These simulations indicate we can maintain farm prices in ranges that result in modest government costs using our farm bill proposal. We are continuing with this scoring process, to come up with the best combination of specifics that increase farm income, and result in reasonable government cost. In the near future, APAC will also provide stochastic modeling of our proposal. This process injects historical annual variability in yields, exports, etc, into the modeling process, to more realistically project what will happen in the real world.

Conclusion

We believe that our proposals can be enacted and administered with reasonable government outlays. We believe that a farm bill such as proposed here would halt and begin to reverse the decline in family farm agriculture, for the good of rural America, and for the good of the nation.

Secretary Veneman and USDA have classified 1998 supplemental AMTA payments as Amber Box for WTO compliance purposes. This appears to mean that virtually any action taken by the U.S. to protect its farmers could be in violation of current WTO rules. Can we realistically protect our national interests under such rigid and unrealistic rules?

We hope the Agriculture Committee recognizes that based on the facts, current farm policy is not working, though many well-meaning members were assured that it would. We believe it is unreasonable to expect different results in the future, if we do not change direction. And we believe that it is unrealistic to expect good farm bill advice from those who misadvised Congress so badly on current farm policy.

I wish to again thank the Committee for this opportunity, and wish to answer any questions you may have.